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1. Introduction 
In reply to a damning observation, that the excised heart of an eel continues to pulse, 
Descartes suggests that there is “in the folds of the heart some humor resembling a 
ferment (or yeast)?”1 What drives him to make this claim? Descartes reports that his 
interlocutor, the physician Plempius, suggested that the view is “quite far-fetched, and 
that [Descartes] was using it as a last resort, as if [he] were hard pressed, and the point 
provided the only way of escape.” 2 Is Plempius right? Is the yeast conjecture little more 
than a desperate attempt to salvage a rationalist theory in the face of an empirical 
counterexample? That is, is Descartes some sort of village rationalist3 who “did not 
control his theory by observation or experiment?”4 Or, is Descartes a kind of empiricist5 
who “seems positively to glory in the face of evidence of the senses, in what can be seen 
and touched?”6 Indeed, in reply to Plempius, Descartes holds that, while his view does 
not require the yeast conjecture, observations and theory both support it. He writes that: 
 
it is necessary to admit that some blood that is rarified remained in [the heart] from one 
diastole to the next, and that rarefaction is increased by the fresh blood that flows in and 
mixes with it; and that the nature and properties of fermentation are clearly relevant to 
this fact.7      
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The protracted debate over the heart’s motion is a rich source of material documenting 
the Cartesian scientific practice of drawing upon both observation and theory. G. Groham 
has correctly noted that neither the village rationalist readings, nor the purely empirical 
readings adequately accommodate both dimensions.8 His third interpretation bring these 
elements together. Shifting focus from method to metaphysics, Gorham maintains that 
Descartes method is shaped by his metaphysics.9 While this approach provides the most 
robust explanation (accommodating both dimensions), it directly contravenes Descartes’s 
repeated claims that his entire philosophy is the product of a method. Method is supposed 
to yield his particular metaphysics. 
 
In what follows, I will explain the yeast conjecture and draw upon an ancient intuition to 
argue that method drives Descartes’s metaphysics. I will not characterize Descartes’s 
method. My task is to show that this intuition is explicitly at work in his discussions 
about the method.  
 
2. The Central Issue: What Causes the Hardening of the Heart? 
The Harvey-Descartes debate over the motion of the heart turns on divergent 
explanations of its hardening. Whereas Descartes maintains that the heart hardens while 
expanding, the English physician William Harvey maintains that it hardens while 
contracting. In de Motu Crodis10 Harvey held that the heart’s motion results from a 
contractile element located in the heart. A “pulsific faculty” originates the initial 
movement in the heart’s right auricle. This contractile movement is the first in a chain of 
four separate and distinct movements. The four movements occur in a four-chambered 
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heart. Blood flows continuously into the right auricle by way of the vena cava. Upon 
reaching capacity, the auricle contracts, driving the blood into the right ventricle. The 
ventricle then contracts, driving the blood into the left auricle by way of the “artery-like 
vein” or pulmonary artery. The left auricle then contracts, driving the blood into the left 
ventricle. These four distinct but perfectly synchronous movements appear as two 
movements with two phases. In the systolic phase, the blood is expulsed. The heart 
whitens, becoming shorter and harder. It strikes the wall of the chest. In diastole the heart 
fills with blood. It reddens, becoming longer and softer.  
 
Descartes did not postulate an inexplicable pulsific faculty. His view requires only one 
type of motion, change in extension. In his Descriptions of the Human Body he holds that 
nutrified venous blood enters the vena cava from the liver. One drop at a time, it fills the 
heart’s right chamber. At the same time, blood enters the heart’s left chamber from the 
‘pulmonary vein’. There are only two chambers. Encountering a heat in the heart, a 
certain ‘fire without light’, the blood is instantaneously rarified. During this process, 
venous valves are forced shut and arterial valves are forced open. The blood in the right 
cavity is driven into the pulmonary artery. The blood in the left chamber is driven into the 
arteries, simultaneously expanding them. The heart becomes longer and softer, once it has 
expelled the blood. This two-chambered heart hardens along with the blood’s expansion. 
 
To summarize both hold that blood is being expelled when the heart hardens. Harvey 
correctly maintains that its hardening is due to contraction. His view relies upon an 
inexplicable pulsific faculty. Descartes held the erroneous view that its hardening is due 
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to the blood’s expansion from a process of instantaneous rarification. His view only 
employs the one source of motion: change in extension. 
 
3. The Pulsing Of an Excised Heart: Two Robust Reconstruction 
The first robust reconstruction pits Harvey’s vitalist conception against Descartes’s 
mechanist physics. Harvey’s relied upon an inexplicable occult quality to explain the 
source of the heart’s motion. Since Descartes’s metaphysical physics will not admit of 
occult qualities, Descartes is forced to reject Harvey’s view as an “unknown or strange 
faculty.” 11 
 
In this vein Descartes’s yeast conjecture could be understood in terms of his  
metaphysical physics. But instead of offering such an account, M. Grene is simply 
astonished by Descartes’s suggestion that a yeast like ferment may lie in the fold’s of the 
heart.  
 
She classifies the conjecture as one of five separate replies, each of which is supposed to 
independently salvage Descartes’s view against the damning counterexample. In Grene’s 
words, the excised heart continues to beat because:   
 
(1) There is always blood; (2) for the purposes of distillation, the less, the better; (3) the 
heart is used to dilating, and so goes on doing it (which seems to contradict the first 
point); (4) perhaps there is “in the folds of the heart some humor resembling a ferment 
(or yeast), by mixing with which another humor, arriving, makes it [the heart] swell.” 
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[…] Finally (5), still answering Plemp’s first objection, Descartes points out that his view 
contradicts and improves on, the common opinion of those who believe that the heart beat 
depends on some faculty of the soul.12   
 
Seemingly unmotivated, these five independent replies are said to be jointly inconsistent. 
The third contradicts the first. Descartes seems to be deeply confused; Plempius’s 
characterization appears apt. The set of five seemingly inconsistent replies appear not to 
be driven by any method, but by desperation.  
 
Whereas the first robust reconstruction dealt with the metaphysical physics, the second 
maintains that both mechanism and mind-body dualism are required to explain 
Descartes’s rejection of Harvey’s view.13 Harvey’s view seems “to require an 
unconscious mental operation, something entirely contrary to the principles of Descarte’s 
dualistic ontology.”14 According to Gorham, Descartes only appeals to a non-physical 
cause where conscious volition is immediately present. All other cases require a 
mechanistic explanation. “[T]his methodological rule follows directly from the dualistic 
metaphysics which confines the capacity for independent action to the realm of spirit.”15 
Gorham is very emphatic about the dependency here. He also writes, “[t]o me it seems 
clear that Descartes’s limited anti-vitalism and his resultant dispute with Harvey derives 
from his famous ontological dualism of mind and body.”16  
 
Recall Grene’s list. Dualism is an issue in the so-called fifth reply. However, dualism per 
se does not explain the yeast conjecture. An appeal to Descartes’s mechanistic framework 
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is required. Unfortunately, Gorham has nothing to say on the matter. In a footnote, 
Gorham defers to Grene’s analysis of the text. As we have seen, Grene’s analysis is 
wanting. 
 
In addition to this wanting analysis, Gorham’s view, that metaphysics drives Descartes’s 
method, is immediately at odds with Descartes’s own view. In what follows, I will correct 
the wanting analysis and show that both Descartes’s dualism and Law B result from his 
development of ancient intuition, showing that method drives Descartes’s philosophy.   
 
4. The Pulsing Of an Excised Heart: Rebalancing the Quantity Of Motion  
The yeast conjecture is not an independent reply within a set of five inconsistent replies. 
The fifth reply stands alone; it alone concerns the soul. The first four are unified by a 
single theme – transfer of motion. This is the basis for his metaphysical physics. 
 
How does Descartes explain the continued pulsing of an excised heart? He rebalances the 
equation between the required motion and the available motion. Since the heart moves, 
the available motion cannot be less than the required motion. For this reason Descartes 
does two things: he decreases the amount required to move the heart and he increases the 
amount available per drop of blood.  
 
If the heart pulses because of expanding blood, blood should be present. Grene’s so-
called first reply, in which it is observed that blood is present, indicates that a source of 
motion is present in the beating heart. This must be confirmed by observation. The so-
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called second reply continues in this vein. By observing that, for the purposes of 
distillation, less blood is better, Descartes is increasing the amount of motion that is 
available per drop of blood. Grene’s so-called third reply misrepresents Descartes point. 
She claims that Descartes held that the heart is “used to dilating and so goes on doing it.” 
However Descartes actually claims that, “as the heart expands and contracts a countless 
number of times from the first movement of its formation, the slightest force is enough to 
impel it to carry out its own repeated movement.”17 In his rebalancing of the equation, 
Descartes is reducing the required amount of motion to move the heart. Finally, the so-
called fourth reply –the yeast conjecture–suggests an additional source of motion, should 
it be required. The presence of a yeast like substance in the folds of the heart increases 
the amount of motion per drop of blood.  
 
The yeast conjecture is part of a unified reply. The entire reply is obligated by 
Descartes’s laws of motion. It is obligated by Law B, which balances the amount of 
motion received with the amount of motion available. According to Law B: When one 
body pushes another it cannot give the other any motion unless it loses as much of its 
own motion at the same time; nor can it take away any of the other’s motion unless its 
own increases by as much.18 Law B informs Descartes’s overall reply and the yeast 
conjecture in particular. 
 
A discussion of motion is required when the issue pertains to extension and changes 
extension: the physical realm. A discussion of mind is required when an opponent 
suggests an explanation involving non-physical elements, such as the soul. To this end, 
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dualism informs, at least, the so-called fifth reply. If Gorham’s analysis of Harvey is 
correct, it may also inform Descartes’s rejection of Harvey’s pulsific faculty. As we will 
see, Descartes’s dualism and the laws of motion result from his unique development of an 
ancient intuition. 
 
5. An Ancient Intuition’s Redevelopment  
The intuition, call it inseparability, is suggestive of a simple, yet powerful means of 
separating the deeper reality from surface appearances. To distinguish between the 
attributes which must belong from those that have no requirement to belong, simply 
remove the elements. Those that unnecessarily belong can be removed with no 
consequence to the underlying subject. Those that must be present cannot be removed 
without destroying the underlying subject.  
 
The intuition informs criterion for non-reciprocal dependency relations, such as priority 
and necessary belonging.19 In Topics VI, 4, for example, Aristotle relies upon the test to 
establish priority. The genus is prior to the species because the species cannot continue to 
exist without it. The genus is inseparable from the species, but the species is separable 
from the genus. Thus, the species is non-reciprocally dependant on the genus. This is how 
Aristotle establishes priority.  
 
Priority relation naturally developed into an interconnected network of dependencies: the 
so-called order of nature. Tuominen characterizes the kind of relational epistemologies 
characteristic of Platonic-Aristotelian frameworks: “reality is taken to have an intelligible 
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structure with discrete elements called forms. The forms have necessary connections with 
each other and the structure involves relations of priority. Therefore, reality itself has an 
intrinsic order. Knowledge in the proper sense is taken to be knowledge about the 
structure of reality.”20 Inseparability informs a test the ancients used to both to identify 
each unity and their relations within an interconnected network. 
 
Not only does Descartes’s conception of reality contain an intrinsic order, but also the 
method by which he arrives at an understanding of this ordered reality explicitly draws 
upon inseparability. In The Search for Truth Descartes claims that,  
 
All truths are interconnected (se invicem consequuntur) and are mutually held together by 
a bond (& mutuo inter se vinculo continentur). The whole secret is [a] to begin with the 
first and simplest truths, and then [b] to proceed gradually and as it were step by step to 
the most remote and most complex truths (a primis et simplicissimis incipiamus, & 
deinde sensim & quasi per gradus usque as remotissimas & maxime compositas 
progrediamur).21  
 
Inseparability informs the means by which Descartes arrives at his basic substances and 
the means by which he identifies their inter-dependencies – they are held by necessary 
bonds. Inseparability is all about testing for such bonds. In his study of basic substances, 
Descartes relies upon the intuition. Consider his assertion in the second Meditation: “[a]t 
last I have discovered it – thought; this alone is inseparable from me.”22  
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Inseparability is equally at work in the discovery of extension as a substance. In the 
second Meditations he writes that,  
 
 
I put the wax by the fire, and look: the residual taste is eliminated, the smell goes 
away, the colour changes, the shape is lost, the size increases; it becomes liquid 
and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you strike it, it no longer makes a sound. 
But does the same wax remain? It must be admitted that it does.23  
 
 
All of these aspects are separable from the piece of wax. The wax remains without them. 
The second Meditation ends with the lesson that “bodies are not strictly perceived by the 
senses or the imagination but by the intellect alone.”24 While this lesson tells us how to 
make proper use of observations, it is not until the sixth Meditation that we have enough 
background to learn that the essence of body is extension. It alone is inseparable from an 
existing body, an extended thing.  
 
The intuition informs part of the method by which Descartes arrives at dualism. It 
ultimately informs Law B. In Le Monde Descartes explicitly grounds the laws of motion 
in God’s simplicity and immutability.25 Law B requires that the quantity of motion be 
preserved through all changes. Descartes tells us that this law “follows manifestly from 
the fact that God is immutable and that, acting always in the same way, he always 
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produces the same effect.”26 The inseparability informs Descartes about God’s attributes, 
such as immutability. In the third Meditation he writes that,   
 
 
the unity, the simplicity or the inseparability of all the attributes of God is one of 
the most important of the perfections which I understand him to have. And surely, 
the idea of the unity of all his perfections could not have been placed in me by any 
cause which did not also provide me with the ideas of the other perfections; for no 
cause could have made me understand the interconnection and inseparability of 
the perfections without at the same time making me recognize what they were.27    
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The yeast conjecture is not, as Plempius suggested, a “far-fetched, last resort.” It is in 
keeping with his metaphysical physics. His conjecture is informed by Law B. Gorham 
errs in holding that Descartes’s metaphysics informs his method. The dualism and Law B 
are both the product of Descartes’s unique redevelopment of an ancient intuition, one 
which informs tests for non-reciprocal dependencies.  
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